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ABSTRACT 
 
How can one provide a nuanced, empirically grounded, analysis of the diverse 
experiences and views of globalization is the question I set out to answer in this paper 
This paper, therefore, explores the meanings of the European Union for various actors 
and social groups in Hungary. I argue that from the perspective of Eastern European 
candidate countries, the EU is a key agent of globalization, and, as such is an appropriate 
proxy for studying globalization in postsocialism.    1 
  
I. Introduction 
On the eve of the Hungarian referendum on joining the European Union, held 
April 12, 2003, a curious poster was banned and confiscated, and its producers arrested. It 
shows three arms extended for hand shaking: the top one bearing a swastika, the middle 
one a read star, and the third one the EU logo (yellow stars on blue). The first two hands 
are shaken, the third one is still awaiting the welcome. The caption says: “it is OK to say 
no.” For EU opponents, each of these hands symbolize a malicious international alliance. 
While this was clearly a minority opinion in the referendum campaign, it brings into 
sharp relief the relationship between a fascist and a communist past on the one hand, and, 
on the other, Hungary’s insertion into the Western economic and political circuits--the 
aim of both EU enlargement and globalization. How can one provide a nuanced, 
empirically grounded, analysis of the diverse experiences and views of globalization is 
the question I set out to answer in this paper. 
 
I will explore the meanings of the European Union for various actors and social 
groups in Hungary. I argue that from the perspective of Eastern European candidate 
countries, the EU is a key agent of globalization, and, as such is an appropriate proxy for 
studying globalization in postsocialism. Without being able to give a full definition of 
globalization, in this paper it will be understood as encompassing, economically, what 
McMichael (1996) calls the globalization project, an international neo-liberal agenda 
aimed not at having various regions catch up with the North/West--the meta-objective of 
the development project--but simply at inserting regions or cities into global free-trade 
networks as competitive suppliers for a particular niche of the world market.
1 Politically, 
globalization, is a project of transferring rights and obligations previously held by nation 
states to supranational agents, while socially and culturally it entails the intensification of 
transnational social relations at the expense of relations among nation-states (Gille and 
O’Riain, 2002; Mato 1997). 
 
In order to make sense of the unevenness and the diverse, if not contradictory, 
experiences of the triplet processes of the collapse of state socialism, entering the EU and 
globalization in postsocialist Eastern Europe,
2 I will apply a framework called ‘global 
ethnography’ in order to provide an analytically coherent and empirically grounded 
understanding of these linkages. 
 
                                                 
1 There is more to this distinction than I can give justice to in this paper. Please refer to 
the original article. 
2 I use the term Eastern Europe to refer to the former socialist countries (excluding 
Russia) instead of the preferred term of the region’s intellectuals, Central Europe, first 
because I want to emphasize the importance of their shared postwar history and, second, 
because the term Central Europe has been often used in an Orientalist fashion, creating 
hierarchies, often bordering on chauvinism, within the region (Todorova, 1997).    2 
Global ethnography is a theoretical and methodological framework developed by 
sociologists (I am one of them) committed to exploring globalization and transnational 
social relations from below, that is, from the perspective of people whose everyday lives 
have been touched by processes associated with globalization.  
  
In Global Ethnography, my colleagues and I argued that people in different parts 
of the world and differently positioned in their respective societies experience 
globalization in radically different ways (Burawoy et al, 2000). We grouped these 
experiences into what we called the three “slices” of globalization: global forces, global 
connections and global imaginations. In the first instance, people experience 
globalization as an external force impinging on the locality and changing their lives in 
ways over which they don’t have any control, restricting their choices to defensive 
reactions and/or adapting. These changes in general are rather negative, such as factories 
closing or cutting welfare as a result of pressures by supranational agencies committed to 
a neo-liberal economic agenda.  
 
People in different positions, however, may find that globalization and 
transnationalization or the deterritorialization of the nation state also offer opportunities. 
For them, such as migrants finding employment in countries that are better off or political 
activists with transnational contacts with movements abroad, globalization opens up a 
space in which they can build connections to improve their lives and better represent their 
interests. They actively participate in building these links which, in turn, sustain them 
economically, socially, culturally and which allow them to maneuver around the global 
forces that otherwise may be more constraining than enabling. 
 
Finally, there are social groups that are not only able to take some control over the 
processes of globalization that affect their lives, but that actively engage in defining, 
contesting and redefining discourses of globalization. They wage their battles much less 
with a localist and defensive agenda, and rather enter political struggles with alternative 
views of what globalization should mean and how it should be shaped in their favor. Here 
the emphasis is on the material power of global imaginations. 
 
In this paper, I will demonstrate how we can employ this tripartite lens to study 
Europe and Europeanization in the context of recent transformations in postsocialist 
countries. I will show that there is much to gain both empirically and theoretically by 
applying such a framework to the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. In 
analyzing Europe and the European Union as global forces, global field and global 
vision, I will primarily draw upon research I have being conducting in Hungary since 
1995. Finally, I will conclude by analyzing and evaluating the patterns of these three 
faces of Europeanization. 
 
II. Europeanization as a global force 
From the perspective of some Western Europeans and EU officials, it may seem 
nonsensical to argue that the EU is a juggernaut-like global force that enters the region 
uninvited threatening collective disenfranchisement and impoverishment. If anything,    3 
they would say, the EU has been chased by the candidate countries and not the other way 
around. They are the ones who, the moment after the communist parties were defeated, 
applied for membership. They are the ones who want to be like Western Europe. 
Members of the Union have not asked them to join them, have little to benefit from 
admitting these poor relatives and if they ever admit them, that will surely follow from 
their charitable commitments to advancing the cause of freedom and democracy and not 
from economic self-interest. So goes the defense of the Europeanization project. 
 
From the perspective of some Eastern Europeans, however, it is difficult to 
separate what in their much-changed lives is the result of the collapse of state socialism, 
of globalization, or of Europeanization. Did the milk they used to buy for a quarter of a 
century disappeared from the stores because the dairy plant that produced it was 
privatized under a new name, because it went bankrupt in the economic crisis following 
1989, because it was bought up by a French multinational that ceased production and 
brought in its products instead (sold at much higher prices) or because it did not meet 
certain EU standards of quality, volume or health regulations? They wouldn’t know, nor 
would the distinction, if it was possible, make any difference to them. Wherever the 
change originates, the average customer has equally little control over what’s on the 
grocery store shelves and how much things cost. 
 
One may also argue that the European Union acts as an external force to the 
extent that, just like the IMF or the World Bank, or any other supranational agency, it 
prescribes a wide range of actions for national governments, whether in the areas of 
finance, industrial policy, or welfare. The EU is no more of a “voluntary” club than are 
the IMF or the World Bank: in order to get economic assistance, in order to survive, 
really, countries must abide by certain rules, which come with their own set of sanctions: 
the denial or reduction of financial support and the postponement of the entry date 
(Bohle, 2002).  
 
EU officials may interject that joining the EU is a deliberative process in which 
the conditions of accession are negotiated rather than imposed. While that may have been 
the case with previous applicants, the Eastern Enlargement seems to be a more limited, 
unilateral process. “This is not a matter of traditional negotiations to find a compromise 
between different interests, but rather of accession negotiations to enable one of the 
parties to attain a predetermined objective with the aid and under the supervision of the 
other,” noted the French Parliament (Grabbe 1998, quoted in Bohle 2002).  
 
In fact, EU membership extends the areas in which supranational organizations 
usually “advise” national governments—it prescribes a rather tight framework of political 
institutions even before formal accession. While it may seem that democratization is an 
internal process--it certainly has been theorized as such in the scholarly literature 
(Burawoy 2001)--and therefore, the choice and the process of joining the European 
Union are initiated and legitimized from below, it would be difficult to argue that the 
“legal harmonization” that must precede ascension is a home-grown transformation. With 
Bessenyey-Williams (2001) I’d argue that in Hungary, for example, democratic 
institutions and legislation have not so much been deliberated upon and built, as much as    4 
imported and adopted wholesale resulting in a double democratic deficit—double 
because national democracy did not even have a chance to realize.
3 
 
Furthermore, one may argue that the institution of the European Union, and 
especially certain changes in it recently, aren’t immune to the larger economic and 
political changes associated with globalization either. Pieterse (1999) is right to argue 
that the EU is not so much riding the car of globalization as much as being driven by it, 
or to stretch the metaphor, run over by it. What he calls the vision of a “competitive 
Europe,” mostly held by neoliberally motivated economists, adds up to nothing less than 
the global restructuring of Europe with a scaled back welfare state and ever-expanding 
space for free trade.  
 
In sum, the externality, the absence of possibilities for exercising control over the 
accession process, and the unidirectionality of the flows of information, orders, and aid 
are a clear indication that the European Union acts as yet another global force for 
postsocialist publics.
4 This view is commonly held by Hungarian farmers and those who 
have already suffered from the Western European overtake of the Hungarian food 
market, especially for dairy products. For them, the maximum production quotas imposed 
by the EU don’t differ much from the minimum quotas demanded by central planning 
and the COMECON. There is also a common fear that the EU will regulate the food 
industry, especially meat production, to such an extent that Hungarians won’t be able to 
afford observing the higher standards and will go out of business. Some argue that even 
communists didn’t interfere with agricultural production processes to the extent the EU 
does.  
 
For people who experience entry in the EU as a global force, such as pensioners, 
farmers, workers who have lost their jobs or are afraid of losing them, Europe is 
primarily a supranational power, a colonizer, and not that different from the Soviet Union 
or the COMECON.  They are bothered by the arrogance and unilateral imposition of 
rules and conditions, and they resent being lectured and talked down to.  
 
III. The building of the European Union  
There is more to this relationship, however. Despite the wholesale adoption of 
legal structures and institutional frameworks, the EU is still a work in progress, and as 
such, it is also a field of connections and actions. In the process of the accession and the 
harmonization, there arise new agents with interests that are neither exclusively national 
                                                 
3 Bohle (2001) makes the analogical argument for the economic transformations in 
postsocialist countries. 
4  It has also been argued that horizontal relations between the countries of the region 
have been once again replaced by vertical relations through the EU, this further 
diminishes the leverage candidate countries may have (Baldwin, 1994, quoted in Bohle 
2002).
 
    5 
or local, nor exclusively regional or international. A whole new stratum of actors emerge, 
whose existence is conditional upon the progress of the Enlargement, who benefit from 
increased contacts with the EU, and who at the same time exercise some collective 
control over the details of the accession process. For such social groups, the accession has 
opened up opportunities and has carved out a brand new social space, not necessarily 
outside of the national boundaries but certainly linked to the nation in a very 
contradictory fashion. 
 
The creation of such a space is not contradictory to the interests of the European 
Union. In fact, the EU has called forth institutions to foster an understanding of its goals 
and a distinctive but shared European identity (Shore 2000). There have been a whole 
series of grants distributed to various organizations (governmental and non-
governmental) and research and educational institutions, as well as newly established 
agencies whose sole raison d’être is the Enlargement.  The EU has also prided itself on 
establishing forums that would make its bureaucracy more transparent and has financially 
supported many projects aimed at increasing input and participation from below. (The 
European Commission, for example, has for the last six years now, invited and paid the 
trips of environmental NGOs to so-called dialogue meetings to negotiate the 
environmental criteria of the accession.). On the one hand, the many professionals, 
policy-makers, bureaucrats, educators, activists are, clearly, the products of the 
Enlargement. On the other, however, the connections they establish among themselves 
and with their counterparts outside the region become the very fabric through which 
Europe is lived and experienced. 
 
Last year I had the opportunity to observe a forum of environmental NGOs from 
various Eastern European countries preparing for their annual meeting with the European 
Commission. The purpose of these meetings is to integrate NGO knowledge and input 
into the harmonization and accession process. Most participants were skeptical of 
whether the EC would actually listen to them or that their suggestion would actually have 
any impact on the conditions of the enlargement, nevertheless, all were interested in 
building connections with the European Union. Let’s not forget that having access to a 
supranational agency allows these organizations to put pressure on their own national 
governments and achieve things that would otherwise be out of their reach. The practice 
of going above the heads of the national governments to put pressure on them has been 
noted as a key novel feature of global social movements (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and of 
a new deterritorialized form of citizenship (Sassen, 2001).  
 
People who have been able to take advantage of new ‘European’ connections, 
primarily see the EU as a field of action, and possibilities, established by laws, 
democratic principles and not in the least, rich resources. This is the meaning the 
Hungarian government conveyed most forcefully during the referendum campaign. 
Government officials repeatedly argued that the only losers would be those who are 
unwilling or unable to change, putting the blame for any potential failure squarely on the 
shoulders of the victims of Europeanization. It is indeed true that taking advantage of 
connections requires a certain know-how, a certain experience, really, a certain social and    6 
cultural capital. Presently, it is primarily professionals and activists that have been able to 
capitalize on these linkages. 
 
IV. Europe as a contested global vision  
No institutional blueprint can be realized were it not for the mobilizing force of 
the ideas it rests on. You know the European Union is no exception when you find even a 
market research institution lamenting a lacking European consumer attitude. 
 
Our contention is that the absence of a widespread sense of European identity is not 
merely a disappointment for europhiles and eurofederalists and the technocratic zealots 
of Maastricht; it actively corrupts the evolution of an ingredient essential to Europe’s 
long-term competitiveness (Henley Centre 1996, quoted in Shore 2000). 
 
What one should feel this sense of belonging to, of course, looks different from 
Eastern Europe, but if one may take Vaclav Havel as somehow expressive of a certain 
identity-anxiety in the region, it is instructive to note that the pressure to define just what 
Europeanness shall mean is no smaller. Havel addressed the European Parliament with 
these words in March 1994:  
 
If this great administrative work, which should obviously simplify life for all 
Europeans, is to hold together and stand the tests of time, then it must be visibly bonded 
by more than a set of rules and regulations. It must embody, far more clearly than it has 
so far, a particular relationship to the world, to human life and ultimately to the world 
order. [Havel 1994.] 
 
He consequently called for “a charter of its own that would clearly define the 
ideas on which it is founded, its meaning and the values it intends to embody.” If there is 
not yet a sense of awareness that the Europe postsocialist countries so badly want to join 
no longer exists—the all-white, all-middle-class, and progressive Europe committed to a 
regulated capitalism—there is certainly an increasing anxiety that Eastern Europe will not 
qualify as a first-class citizen of the Union. It is therefore crucial for the candidate 
countries to receive some kind of a guarantee that they will be judged European enough 
to deserve all the perks of being EU members. Their need for a well-defined European 
cultural agenda is therefore quite different but no less consequential. The selectiveness, if 
not the arbitrariness, of the Enlargement process has already compelled a veritable rivalry 
among East-Europeans—both among and within the individual countries—for 
demonstrating one’s worthiness. For the time being, this results in the reinforcement 
instead of in the challenging of the traditional, classic, and mono-cultural repertoire of 
Europeanness.
5 
                                                 
5 A wonderful example of this process is provided by Böröcz’s analysis of an open letter 
written by leading Hungarian intellectuals in 2001 to Lionel Jospin, then-president of 
France, to thank him for granting asylum to Roma refugees from Hungary, as befits the    7 
 
These ideas, values, culture, religions, and identities that are associated with a 
unified Europe are of course well-known to all: modernity, progress, civilization, high 
culture, democracy, etc. (Herzfeld, 2002; Pieterse, 1991; Wilson, Kevin and Jan van der 
Dussen, 1999). That the Europe based on these is a fiction (Pieterse, 1991), and that 
Europe as a historical project is parasitic upon practices that are contradictory to these 
ideals, most notably imperialism and fascism, (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992; Fanon 
1966; Gilroy, 1993; Gosnell, 2002; Hall, 1991a, 1991b; Pieterse 1999) deducts little if 
anything from their power. 
 
Clearly, it has not been lost on people in need of defending their interest, that the 
magic words ‘Europe’ and ‘EU’ open previously closed doors and “empty” pockets. 
Increasingly, an updated, “Europeanized” political rhetoric is not only an added 
advantage, but an indispensable entry ticket to public discourse and decision-making 
forums. The idea nevertheless has its roots in concrete practices. The many projects of the 
European Union aiming at establishing a European identity, a sense of belonging to a 
unified Europe, exhibitions, books, curricula, “European days,” and so many other 
cultural events instill in citizens if not the desired European consciousness then, surely, 
the recognition that claiming some entitlement to representing Europe, will get the 
needed attention of the media and of politicians, just like in the past claiming an 
entitlement to representing the interests of socialism did. As one of the leaders of the 
Regional Environmental Center in Hungary put it somewhat resentfully, each of their 
projects had to be framed in terms of its connections with or implications for the 
country’s entry into the EU whether the connections were there or not (Perneczky 1999). 
 
To cite an example from my research, organizations specializing in biodiversity 
and wilderness protection have been making the powerful argument that Hungary, unlike 
the much more urbanized Western half of the continent still has pockets of wilderness 
and is endowed with unique ecosystems home to a wide range of species. Therefore, they 
say, the conditions of joining the EU should include the retention of the relatively strict 
conservation laws of Hungary, rather than adopting the laxer EU regulations 
(Scandinavian activists have been arguing in a similar vein as well). In a way, these 
activists are appealing to the ecological conscience of the European Union, and as such, 
claim themselves some authority and moral capital.  
    
I would hypothesize, however, that the proliferation of Europeanized political 
rhetoric is not merely instrumental or epiphenomenal. That is, while it is a useful tool in 
claims making, the rhetoric eventually turns discursive, producing new truth regimes, 
new practices and ultimately transforming Europe itself. It maybe somewhat early to 
draw such conclusions but the practices this use of Europe as a global vision gives rise to 
certainly deserves more scholarly attention and would make for an exciting research 
agenda.  
                                                                                                                                                 
“honorable traditions of the French nation,” ignoring centuries of French colonialism 
(2002).    8 
 
For example, in my own case study of a Hungarian village that invited a French 
multinational corporation to build a toxic waste incinerator, a lot of what may have 
seemed as an exclusively environmental siting controversy centered upon the 
environmental and economic nature of the district composed by the surrounding villages. 
Pro-incinerator forces claimed that the facility would not only bring resources to rebuild 
the run-down infrastructure of the villages but by bringing high technology and 
international connections, it would insert the district into the bloodstream of Europe. 
Greens and opposing villages however saw the EU and its French representative as 
interested in only turning them into wastelands at a huge profit enriching only the West. 
They decided to pursue the case not only at the local and national level but also at the 
continental, global level: they established connections with Western Greens and 
Europeanized their rhetoric. For the pro-incinerator party, Europe was a missionary, 
civilizing force, for the greens it was primarily a criminal, colonizing one. Furthermore, 
both sides had rather different visions of what European should mean in the local context. 
Those against the incinerator wanted to build the localities’ future on traditional 
economic activities, primarily farming. Pro-incinerator actors, however, saw no future in 
those areas and claimed that the only salvation lies in foreign high-tech capital infusion.  
 
In such cases, we see the EU or its members as coming in defining the parameters 
of regional development or environmental policy--acting as a global force. At the same 
time, we see the birth of a stratum of professionals and activists who use the newly 
established connections with the EU, including organizations within member countries, to 
influence the process but also to build a survival strategy. Thirdly, we also see the 
contestation of imposed meanings of Europeanness and of the place in question. 
Activists, residents and local decisionmakers ride the EU-wave to forge new connections, 
access new resources and therefore create new places. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, let me analyze the relationship among these three slices of 
Europeanization and draw out the political implications. 
 
Considerable, if not yet systematized, effort has been made to assess who the 
winners and losers are of the postsocialist transition and, to the extent that the distinction 
can be made, of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU (Lengyel and Blaskó 2002). I would 
somewhat unabashedly argue that the three-partite framework of global ethnography 
provide us with a more nuanced sociological picture than that provided by the 
winner/loser paradigm. First of all, the winner/loser paradigm operates with a one-
dimensional view of human beings, usually reducible to species of the homo economicus. 
Studies informed by the loser/winner dichotomy can excellently assess economic life 
trajectories through the quantitative analysis of employment, earnings, and property 
ownership data, among others, however, it fails to account for experiences in the 
political, cultural, and social areas of life--to start with a list of crude categories. How 
could one convey the subtleties of political gain or loss in status, for example, through 
this binarism? Both political gain and loss in status will depend on one’s place of    9 
residence, gender, ethnicity, age, level of education, and a host of other even-harder-to-
quantify factors.  
 
Even if we remain within the economic focus, however, the winner/loser 
paradigm will have a hard time integrating experiences that have to do with a change in 
opportunities, a transformation of space of maneuver. Lynne Haney (2000) provides such 
a study of Hungarian mothers, newly deprived of their welfare entitlements, arguing that 
it is not merely the reduction in welfare payments that hit these women hard, but, equally 
importantly for their individual experience, the fact that the criteria of entitlement 
changed from mother to needy and the abolition of non-monetary assistance, which, in 
the past, allowed women to tailor the assistance they needed (missing fathers, abusive 
husbands, lack of childcare, etc.) to their individual needs. It is this radical reduction in 
the space of maneuver that women find disempowering, yet it is exactly this kind of 
experience that is hard to capture with a winner/loser paradigm. Furthermore, a woman 
may not receive less monetary welfare benefit now than prior to the welfare reforms, but 
the fact that she has to ask for it, the fact that she has to go through means testing, and the 
fact that her needs are translated into a mere financial need make for institutionalized 
stigmatization.  
 
The villages in my case study, to provide another example, may also look just as 
poor as before 1989, yet they now have political and economic opportunities that have 
been opened up partially by the collapse of the party state, partially by globalization and 
partially by the prospect of the entry in the EU. 
 
The Hungarian activist-intellectual may still be living in the same small factory-
produced apartment, but s/he now has the ability to be in touch with, talk to and learn 
from, intellectuals and activists outside the country because of collaboration among 
universities endorsed and funded by the EU. 
 
My point is not to relativize the quite general loss in economic terms, but to 
demonstrate that if we are to give a from-below and emic account of people’s experiences 
and perceptions of recent changes in postsocialist countries, the 
forces/connections/imaginations framework does a better job than the winner/loser 
paradigm. 
 
This tool kit also allows us to see patterns, conjunctions, contradictions in 
people’s experiences, and thus to draw conclusions at the macrosocial level. The key 
general question is what collective experience, and thus collective action may result from 
an “uneven distribution” of experiencing Europeanization as forces, connections or 
imaginations? What happens when a village or region only sees the force-aspect of the 
EU and cannot find a way to latch onto the EU project with its own agendas and build its 
own connections? What happens when the only social group capable of turning the 
enlargement process into an opportunity are professionals—a likely scenario given that 
the free-flow of labor between postsocialist countries and Western Europe are not 
expected for a number of years even after the Enlargement? Is it politically risky if the 
European Union is consequently exlusively associated with elites and elitism (the latter    10  
being the result of the EU cultural politics)? Can the liberal parties in the region afford 
any further alienation from the Europeanization project? 
 
In this paper, I showed that differently positioned people experience globalization 
differently. Consequently, the meanings and symbols mobilized by or imputed to 
globalization will vary not just with the cultural repertoire available to various actors but 
also with whether the experience under study is more of globalization as a force, 
connections or imaginations. In Eastern Europe, the EU acts as a primary agent of 
globalization, justifying my use of this tripartite global ethnographic framework to 
analyze why people resort to conflicting uses of Europe as a symbol. Finally, I argued 
that by scrutinizing the patterns of these different uses we can provide an emic picture of 
changing social inequalities. It is only from such a from-below perspective that we can 
claim to speak for people, rather than merely speak on their behalf.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    11  
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